Conflict in the South China Sea: The US, China and ASEAN

By Bob Curry

The danger posed by the People’s Republic of China’s (China’s) decision to expand its national territorial boundaries into the East and South China Sea regions is real, extreme and growing. This is particularly true of its expansion into the South China Sea because China’s incursion there has raised security concerns among US government and military policy makers. Their concern has led to a US naval and air buildup in the region and therein lies the danger because Chinese air and naval military units are already active throughout the region. The obvious danger is inherent in a situation that could give rise to a possible accidental or purposeful armed clash. This would destabilize all of East Asia and threaten global security. The stakes are high: dealing with the conflict effectively is essential and requires taking into account all factors that could either lessen or worsen the likelihood of armed conflict. Analyses of the South Asia Sea issue in the US thus far have proceeded without taking into account adequately a fundamental fact—that is, members of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) have been dealing with China over the issue for some time. Failing to account fully for ASEAN’s role in the conflict means that the US runs the risk of separating itself from how the ASEAN group has chosen to try to deal with China. This failure risks heightening tensions or at least impeding efforts to moderate them.

Of the ten members of ASEAN, five are challenging China’s expanded territorial claims by making claims of their own. The countries claiming territorial rights that clash with China’s are Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The conflict’s core centers on control of the Spratly Islands, a potentially oil rich, marine resource wealthy and strategically located area in the middle of the South China Sea. The other ASEAN members are united in their collective support of the group of five: they are Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Singapore. The conflict pits China against ten neighboring East Asian countries whose economies are so fundamentally interlinked with China’s that they all share mutual benefits derived from patterns of trade in goods and services, investment and technology sharing, financial linkages and cross border worker migration. From the Chinese perspective, these are important factors that contribute to China’s efforts to maintain high levels of growth in national income, aggregate output, consumption, employment, physical and social infrastructure development along with price level stability.

The economic linkages between China and the ASEAN region are so profoundly and mutually beneficial that members of ASEAN and China have (i) agreed to co-membership in Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), (ii) China is one of the members of an ASEAN + 6 economic cooperation arrangement, (iii) ASEAN and China have concluded a mutual Free Trade Agreement; (iv) ASEAN members are not only open to the new infrastructure development bank that the Chinese have created but Laos and Myanmar have already received loans; (v) along the Mekong basin five ASEAN member states along with China’s Yunnan Province have formed a highly integrated open economic territory called the Greater Mekong Region and (vi) China has invited several Southeast Asian nations to hold join maritime exercises in the South China Sea.

The combination of institutional and diplomatic connections and market linkages as well as many shared cultural values mesh ASEAN with Chinese interests in ways that provide a basis for finding an acceptable Spratly arrangement—and decision-makers on both sides know it! I’m confident about making this point because during the time that I was a Senior Fulbright Researcher at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore it became clear to me that Southeast Asian national leaders seek ways to assure that conflicts are either avoided or where and when they do occur they will be resolved. A good example of this phenomenon is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): it brings together contesting parties from throughout East Asia in an effort to avoid or resolve disputes such as the one involving the Spratly Islands. Partly as result of ARF discussions, an agreement has been reached that assures that there will be no impediments to navigation and commerce--but the key issue of competing territorial claims remains unsettled. Another unsettled issue has to do with China’s land recovery efforts from the reef system because doing so could support a Spratly-based air strip that could be used both for commercial and military purposes. A companion concern is the creation of nearby maritime and naval support facilities that the Chinese have built.

There are two basic ways to deal with the Spratly Island issue: one is via military confrontation and the other is through negotiations based on closely held shared interests. Because the US appears on a course focusing on the former and the ASEAN group is clearly concentrating on the latter, a messy situation (and a very dangerous and serious one) is emerging and for the most part it’s flying well “under the radar” when it comes to US media coverage. When trying to understand and analyze the issue while teaching an Asian Economic Development course at the University of Hawaii’s main campus at Manoa on the island of Oahu, I suggested to my students that they begin the effort by consulting these three high quality and easily accessible printed and video sources : the Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/south-china-sea; the Center for Strategic and International Studies, www.csis.org and the British Broadcasting System, www.bbc.com. The videos can also be located indirectly on www.youtube.com.

Let me conclude with three observation. First, while it’s currently difficult for the South China Sea issue to find a niche in media reporting, this will change because the issue is becoming more intense, growing in importance and showing increasing signs of entrenched conflicts. Second, make no mistake about it: future reporting will note: China will not retreat from its territorial claims; the US will not stray from its effort to mute those claims; and ASEAN will remain open to dealing with China diplomatically…and watching what happens will be far more than simply interesting. Third, the same sort of factors pertain to the East China Sea where Japan is involved. Because of this the interplays of Asian interests are so great that there’s some chance for a livable settlement wherein no party gets everything it wants but everyone avoids the worst possible outcome.

Hang on because it’s going to be an interesting run!!!

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